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TOPICS AND THEMES TREATED IN THE DIALOGUES

INTELLECTUALISM
William Prior
Intellectualism is a view attributed to Socrates
in several of Plato's Socratic dialogues that
treats certain mental states, in particular virtue and vice, as states of the intellect alone,
and which, as a result, denies the existence of
moral weakness (akrasia; q.v.). Intellectualism
is especially prominent in the Laches, Gorgias,
Euthydemus, Protagoras and Meno.

(I) V1RTUE Is KNOWLEDGE
Perhaps the most prominent mental state
that receives an intellectualist treatment at
the hands of Plato is virtue. In the La., while
attempting to define courage, Laches comes
up with a definition of what Socrates calls
'virtue entire': knowledge of all goods and
evils (La. 199c-d) . Why is virtue knowledge?
The Men . provides the following argument:
virtue is good, makes us good and is thus beneficial. Other goods, such as health, strength,
beauty and wealth, or the psychological qualities moderation, justice, courage, intelligence,
memory and munificence, are sometimes beneficial and sometimes harmful. What renders
them beneficial is right use; what produces
right use is knowledge (understanding, wisdom). Thus knowledge, as the only intrinsically beneficial quality a person can possess,
is virtue (Men. 87b-9a). A similar argument
occurs in the Euthd. (278e-82d).
The Prt. offers a detailed account of what
is meant by happiness and wisdom, one
that is unique to the Socratic dialogues . In
an argument with the many, Socrates leads
them to admit that they regard pleasure as
good and pain as bad (Prt. 354c). Given this
account of happiness, Socrates argues that
wisdom is an art of measurement of pleasure
and pain (358a-b).
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(0)

knowledge 'as being utterl y dragged around
... as if it were a slave' (352c). The position
sha red by Socrates a nd Protagoras, in co ntrast, is tha t :

VICE I s I GNORANCE

If virtue is knowledge, it is easy to und erstand
vice as ignora nce. In th e passage of the M en.
discussed above Socrates states, 'a ll that th e
soul undertakes and endures, if directed by
wisdom, ends in happiness, but if directed
by ignorance, it ends in the opposite' (Men.
88c). The Euthd., in th e sa me ve in states,
'with respect to a ll th e things we ca ll ed good
in the beginning, the correct acco unt is not
that in th em selves are th ey good by na ture,
but rather as follows: if igno ra nce co ntrol s
th em , they a re grea ter evil s than th eir o pposi tes' (Eu thd. 281d). T he a na lysis o f vice in
the Prt. yields the following acco unt of ignorance as vice :

If, then, I said, the pleasant is good, no
one w ho either knows o r believes ot her
things are better than the things he is
doing, and possible, then d oes those
things if he is capable of the better; nor is
th e 'being worse than oneself' a n ything
ot her th a n igno ra nce a nd 'being stronger
th an o nese lf' a nything other th a n wisdom. (Prt. 358c. Tr. Prior)
This ignora nce is identified as fa lse beli ef; th e
belief in question is a miscalcul atio n of the
magnitude of pleasure and pain in vo lved in
a particular course of actio n , a n error in perspecti ve (356c-e) .

(ID) No

ONE

DoES WRONG W1LL1NGLY

Perhaps th e most paradoxical claim m th e
intellectu a li st position is the denial of akrasia (q .v.), m o ra l weakness. The phenom eno n
of moral weakness is a lleged to occur when
o ne, in full possessio n of knowl edge of the
best course of action, nevertheless chooses
an inferi o r course, und er th e influence of
som e o ther menta l sta te. 'The ma ny' think of

know ledge is a fine thing, capa ble of
ruling a person, a nd if so meone were
to know what is good and bad, then he
would not be forced by anything to act
other than as know ledge dictates, and
intelligence would be sufficient to save a
person. (352c)

The m ost elaborate Socrati c a rgum ent
aga inst ak rasia, of which the above claim is
a part, occurs in the Prt. and relies on the
ass umption of hedo nism (35 46--d ). The m a n y
believe in akrasia beca use they believe th a t a
person knowing full well th at a g ive n acti on
is more beneficial than a nother, will noneth eless perform th at oth er actio n because of
being overcome by pleasure (352d-e). O n
th e assumpti o n th a t pleasure is th e good ,
Socra tes shows that thi s view of th e ma ny
does not m ake se nse by substituting 'good'
for 'pleasant' in th eir position. The diffi c ulty
with this argument is that it o nly works o n
th e ass umpti o n of hedo nism, a nd the Prt. is
th e o nl y dia logue in which Plato advocates
hedonism , even for th e sake of argum ent.
(IV)

LATER D EVELO PM ENTS

The intellect ua list position described above is
prominent in the 'Socratic' di a log ues, though
it is also prese nt in Laws. The Republic
offe rs a different mo ra l psyc hology a nd a
new theory of virtue. For some scho la rs (e.g.
Penner 2002) this cha nge m ar ks a transition
between the view of the histo ri ca l Socrates
a nd th e view of Plato. The major development in the R. tha t gives rise to the mo dification or a bandonm ent of intellectualism is th e
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introducti o n, in bk 4, of th e tripartite concepti o n of the sou l. The so ul is di vided into three
distin ct pa rts: reason, spirit a nd a ppetite.
Whereas th e intellectua list picture identified
as virtue as a whole with knowledge, th e new
th eory a llocates the virtues to different parts
of th e so ul. Closest to th e intel lectu al concepti o n of th e so ul is reason, to which is assigned
the virtu e of wisdom . The spirited part of the
sou l is ass igned the virtue of courage, while
th e virtues of temperance and justi ce are a llocated to the three parts in combinati on (R. bk
4.442c-d ). The Prt. had described wisdom as
a powerful force, capa ble of ruling a person;
the R ., in contrast, describes reason, th e seat
of wisdom, as requiring th e aid of spirit if it is
to prevail over the appetites (441e). Further,
whereas th e Socratic dialogues had insisted
that every desire was for the good (cf., e.g.
Grg. 4 686; also Kahn 2008:4 a nd Penner
2002:195), the R. defines thirst in terms of
drink and warns against adding 'good ' to the
object of desire (R. bk 4.437d-8b) . Despite
this new theory of the R., aspects of intellectu alism reappear in the dia logues genera ll y considered late, in particu lar in th e Lg.
(5.731c; 9.860d) a nd Timaeus (86d; cf. Kahn
1996:72n). This renders doubtful th e claim
th at Plato ever aba nd o ned th e centra l tenets
of intellectu alism.
See a lso: Brickhouse and Smith (2009),
Irwin (1977a), Nehamas (1999), Segvic (2002)
and Shorey (1903).
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